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I. INTRODUCTION
Early in 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced that all
prison chapel reading materials would be limited to a single list of ac1
ceptable publications. The impetus behind the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’s action was a 2004 report from the Department of Justice’s
Inspector General, which recommended that materials in prison libraries be cataloged and possibly tracked to prevent them from being
2
used to “incite violence and hatred.” Instead of simply cataloging all
library materials in federal prisons (the task proved too daunting),
the Federal Bureau of Prisons decided to compile a limited list of acceptable books in what it called the Standardized Chapel Library Pro3
ject. These limitations brought about protests from Congress, First
Amendment rights groups, and prisoners’ rights groups. A class action suit is pending, but there has been no ruling on the constitu4
tionality of the Standardized Chapel Library Project.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has the right to exclude certain
materials due to safety issues from prison libraries; however, it cannot
issue a single, limited list of acceptable religious texts, as such an issuance would unacceptably violate the free exercise rights of prisoners.
To do so would be a violation of the First Amendment rights of individuals incarcerated in the federal prison system—unless the Federal
Bureau of Prisons is able to show that it serves a compelling governmental interest with no viable alternatives. The prison system should
either develop an effective means for cataloging and tracking materials within prison chapel libraries, or it should create a standard list of
materials that are clearly unacceptable. The Standardized Chapel Li-
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brary Project, as enacted, unacceptably infringes on prisoners’ free
exercise rights.
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
5
thereof.” As a rule, courts usually do not interfere with prison administration, due to the historical belief that convicted felons were
6
civilly dead. Federal courts have also shown much deference to the
rules and practices of both federal and state prison administration—
except when this administration infringes upon constitutionally pro7
tected rights.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that in assessing whether or not a prison regulation infringes upon an incarcerated person’s
constitutional rights, courts should apply a balancing test that looks
to the following factors: (a) if there is a valid governmental interest
behind the prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this
regulation the incarcerated person has other means of exercising his
rights; (c) how the assertion of this right would impact prison costs
and resources; and (d) whether there are alternative means that can
8
be used to satisfy the governmental interest. Further, since Congress’s enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
9
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in 2000, the free exercise concerns of prisoners have merited a higher level of scrutiny by the courts.
Judicial attitudes towards the regulation of the federal prison system have been characterized largely by deference to decisions made
10
by prison officials. Federal courts have ruled, on First Amendment
grounds, with regard to prisoners’ personal possession of certain writ11
ten materials. The Supreme Court has found that inmates can be
deprived of magazines, newspapers, and other written materials if
prison administrators can demonstrate that this deprivation satisfies
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U.S. CONST. amend. I.
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Provision of Religious Facilities for Prisoners, 12 A.L.R.3D 1276,
1278 (1967).
See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833 (1977) (noting that prison administrators have
“wide discretion” to act, insofar as they do so within constitutional bounds).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–91 (1987).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (“Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or
regulations.”); Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246, 249 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (holding
that prison officials could limit the correspondence of Muslim prisoners for reasons of
safety).
See Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Prison Regulation of Inmates’
Possession of Personal Property, 66 A.L.R.4TH 800, 819 (1988).
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legitimate governmental interests—for example, in order to promote
12
prison safety or to create incentives for good behavior. Courts have
further held that prison administrators may also restrict prisoners’
access to printed pornographic materials without infringing on First
13
Amendment rights.
Within prisons, religious activities themselves may be regulated, as
long as these regulations are not discriminatory, arbitrary, or unrea14
15
sonable. For example, in Cooke v. Tramburg, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that banning congregation of Nation of Islam prisoners did not meet the standard of “capricious or arbitrary” because
16
it served the purpose of preserving prison order. Similarly, in Childs
17
v. Pegelow, the Fourth Circuit held that prison officials did not have
to adhere to meal times demanded by Muslim inmates, as it would
unduly strain prison resources and prison officials had already made
18
reasonable concessions to the meal times required by Islamic faith.
In some cases, prisoners are allowed to access additional materials
19
that are only of critical religious value. In other cases, prisoners are
allowed to obtain a wide range of religious materials, ranging from
books on general religious theory to periodicals—though courts have
traditionally upheld prison restrictions on these materials if they
seem to serve the interest of preserving order or safety within the
20
prison system. By and large, the case history focuses on restrictions
upon the personal property of the inmates and their ability to obtain
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Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530–31 (2006).
See, e.g., Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (upholding restrictions on
prisoners’ access to homosexual pornography on the grounds that while prisoners had
the right to possess the material, there was no possible way the prison administration
could protect inmates possessing such material from reprisals from other inmates); Snow
v. Woodford, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (restricting prisoners’ access to
pornographic materials on the grounds that it negatively impacted inmate relations with
female corrections officers).
See Shipley, supra note 6, at 1281.
43 N.J. 514 (1964).
Id. at 523.
321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 490–91.
See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 255–58 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting a member of the
Nation of Islam access to religious texts specific to the Nation of Islam).
See Blazic v. Fay, 251 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (holding that a prisoner
should not be deprived of a right to receive religious material, unless that material may
affect the proper discipline and management of the prison system). But see Ind v. Wright,
44 F. App’x 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoners practicing a religion based
in white supremacy should not have access to outside materials that could incite racial violence within prison). See generally Shipley, supra note 6 (collecting cases).
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materials from outside of the prison itself. It appears that no cases
deal directly with materials that are already available in the chapel library of a federal prison and whether or not they can be withdrawn
or limited without a specific cause. Case law concerning free exercise
rights of prisoners, coupled with the passage of RLUIPA, provides
more guidance on the issue.
This Comment examines the legal framework surrounding the
First Amendment rights of individuals incarcerated in federal prisons.
It aims to determine just what the government’s compelling interests
are in initiating the Standardized Chapel Library Project, and whether such an undertaking is compatible with the constitutional rights
afforded to inmates in federal prisons. In order to overcome the
constitutional difficulties of the Standardized Chapel Library Project,
the Federal Bureau of Prisons must somehow show that the Project
passes both RLUIPA scrutiny and the Supreme Court’s balancing test
for prison regulations that infringe on constitutional rights. In light
of recent case law, it will be necessary for the Federal Bureau of Prisons to show (1) that there is a valid, compelling governmental interest in creating an enumerated list of religious materials that are to be
made available in federal prison libraries; (2) that this enumerated
list will still allow inmates to exercise their First Amendment rights
with regard to religions; (3) just how allowing uncensored chapel libraries in federal prisons will impact prison safety and resources; and
(4) whether there are other ways the government can achieve the
ends of the Standardized Chapel Library Project without limiting the
resources available in chapel prisons.
It will first be necessary to examine the limitations that the federal
prison system may exert on a prisoner’s free exercise rights. By exploring cases dealing with these matters in the past half-century, a
theoretical framework of what has been historically allowed and prohibited with regard to religious practice within the federal prison system can be established. Further, such an examination will hopefully
reveal just how these limitations have interacted with the First
Amendment.
The Comment then examines the origins of the Standardized
Chapel Library Project, comparing the actions of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons to the recommendations made by the Department of Justice. These facts are then applied to the treatment of free exercise
rights in courts and current legislation to show that the Standardized

21
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Chapel Library Project is in violation of current standards for prisoners’ free exercise rights. In the past, federal courts have allowed prison administrators to limit the exercise of religion if the administration could make a compelling argument that such limitations
promoted or aided prison safety. However, current standards range
from a test for whether the policy is rationally related, to an examina22
tion of the penological interests, to a compelling interest test. After
examining the application of these standards, the Comment makes
policy considerations in light of the controversial nature of the Stan23
dardized Chapel Library Project.
II. BACKGROUND
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded to prisoners
by courts has waxed and waned throughout history. Courts have traditionally weighed the interests of the State against those of the individual protected by the Constitution, and have given great deference
to the determinations made by prison officials, with some emphasis
on advances in prison efficiency and safety that have been achieved
24
through the curtailment of rights. Such practice brings with it a
number of difficult questions, first and foremost whether First
Amendment rights should be broadly sacrificed for what may prove
to be either marginal or imaginary gains in security or economic efficiency. At the heart of the matter rests the question of just what
rights a prisoner retains when incarcerated, and whether these rights
should be dictated by prison officials or by judicial interpretation of
the Constitution. The progression of prisoners’ free exercise rights
has grown from an early period of non-recognition, to a multifaceted
debate that has encompassed the latter half of the twentieth century,
to contemporary struggles between courts, prison officials, and congressional legislation designed to protect the free exercise of religion.

22
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Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (applying a compelling interest standard
to a compulsory school attendance law as applied to members of the Amish religion), with
Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763 (2003) (upholding a requirement that Orthodox Jewish
prisoners fill out standard prison forms to receive kosher meals on the grounds that it
served a legitimate penological interest).
See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
Mayu Miyashita, Comment, City of Boerne v. Flores and Its Impact on Prisoners’ Religious
Freedom, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 519, 544–49 (1999); see Derek L.
Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner
Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 508–09, 552–53 (2005).
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A. The Bad Old Days
Traditionally, the incarcerated were regarded as possessing no
rights of their own, with their lives and actions beyond the reach of
25
the Bill of Rights. The classic example is Ruffin v. Commonwealth, in
which Ruffin—an escaped convict who was tried and convicted for
murdering the officer guarding him—argued that his conviction
26
could not be upheld because a jury of his peers did not convict him.
The court found that Ruffin possessed no such right because the pro27
tections of the Constitution did not extend to the incarcerated.
Writing for the court, Judge Christian explained:
[A]s a consequence of his crime, [Ruffin] not only forfeited his liberty,
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. He is civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a
28
dead man.

An individual regarded as civiliter mortuus is considered “civilly dead,”
29
and no civil rights can be afforded to him. Justice Christian effectively erased the rights identity of prisoners with his ruling, and for
much of early American history, prisoners were only granted the
30
meager rights afforded to them by state laws and prison officials.
This included a lack of First Amendment religious rights, which often
found their utmost limit at traditional American notions of Christian31
ity.
Some courts hinted that a viable claim might have existed for
prisoners’ free exercise rights, but such a cause of action was not utilized. A telling example of this can be found in Justice Field’s opinion
32
in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, heard by a circuit court in California in
1879. Ho Ah Kow, a Chinese citizen residing in the United States
who was arrested and imprisoned in California, had been subject to a
California law that mandated the shearing off of all prisoners’ hair
33
beyond a certain length. At the time, it was customary for male
Chinese immigrants in California to wear a queue, a long braid of
hair at the back of the head that bore significant social and religious
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 796.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (8th ed. 2004).
Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 506–07.
Id. at 506.
12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
Id. at 253.
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34

significance. Ho Ah Kow alleged that the State of California had in35
fringed upon his rights by forcing him to cut his queue in prison.
The court held that the law requiring the hair cutting was invalid on
36
equal protection grounds. Interestingly, the court also noted that
the California law was offensive to prisoners’ religious rights, and posited that prison regulations forcing Jewish prisoners to eat pork
37
would be similarly reprehensible. In a sense, Ho Ah Kow stepped to
the threshold of defending prisoners’ free exercise rights, but hesitated at the last moment. True recognition of a viable claim given to
prisoners whose First Amendment rights had been infringed did not
come about until the 1960s.
B. The ‘60s: Free Love, Rock n’ Roll, and First Amendment Rights for
Prisoners
Up until the latter half of the twentieth century, courts rarely in38
tervened on behalf of prisoners on free exercise grounds. Courts
took the attitude that it was their place only to decide who was deserving of punishment, and not to direct the manner in which that pun39
ishment was meted out. Then, beginning in the 1960s, courts began
to become more positively disposed to the notion that prisoners
could potentially raise free exercise claims, responding to demands
made in part by the increasing number of religious minorities in
40
American prisons.
41
The landmark case during this period was Cruz v. Beto, which
brought the issue of free exercise amongst prisoners to the doorstep
of the Supreme Court. Cruz was a Buddhist inmate of the Texas Department of Correction, who alleged that the Department of Corrections prevented him, through punitive means, from holding Buddhist
42
services and instructing other prisoners of Buddhist teachings.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 255.
Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again? Legislative Responses to
City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2339 (1998).
See, e.g., Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (arguing that courts should not
monitor prison administration, and should only intercede when an individual is unjustly
imprisoned); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952) (holding that courts have
no ability to supervise the disciplining of prisoners, and may only review habeas claims).
Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 507.
405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
Id. at 319.
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When Cruz attempted to share Buddhist materials with other inmates, he was placed in solitary confinement and restricted to a diet
43
of bread and water. At the time, the Texas Department of Corrections only recognized faiths based in Protestantism, Catholicism, or
44
Judaism. The Supreme Court held that the failure by the Texas Department of Corrections to afford Cruz a “reasonable opportunity” to
pursue his faith was a violation of Cruz’s free exercise rights under
45
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz gave
hope to all inmates who felt that their religious rights were being cur46
tailed.
During the years immediately following Cruz, lower courts began
developing varying standards of review for the free exercise claims of
prisoners, showing more willingness to enforce prisoners’ rights when
they were curtailed for reasons of economic efficiency, and less when
47
they were retrenched on grounds of prison security. A number of
circuits applied varying tests and levels of scrutiny to prisoners’ First
48
Amendment claims.
In 1969, the District of Columbia Circuit established a very strict
standard for examining prisoners’ free exercise claims in Barnett v.
49
Rodgers. The prisoners in Barnett argued that the District of Columbia jail failed to meet the requirements of their Islamic dietary stan50
dards, violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Prison officials of the District of Columbia at first argued that prison
meals did not contain large amounts of pork, and then later, in the
presence of contrary evidence, argued that making allowances for
Muslims was not cost effective, as pork products constituted a signifi51
cant portion of prison menus. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia remanded the case for further examination, holding
that prisoners’ free exercise rights could only be limited if a “compel-

43
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 507.
Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First Amendment Values: The Prisoners’ Dilemma, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1620–23 (1991); see also St. Claire v. Cuyler. 634 F.2d 109, 116
(3d Cir. 1980) (holding that prison officials could prevent the use of Muslim head coverings on grounds of security); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (invalidating prison regulations that deprived Muslim prisoners of pork-free meals on the
grounds of costs).
Frankel, supra note 47, at 1622–24.
410 F.2d 995 (1969).
Id. at 997.
Id. at 998, 1001–02.
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ling state interest” existed, and there were “no alternative forms of
52
regulation.”
The outcome of this era of litigation produced no one clear standard of treatment for free exercise claims made by incarcerated indi53
viduals. In the wake of Cruz v. Beto, courts began to honor the
claims of prisoners who felt that prison regulations were infringing
upon their free exercise rights. Just what kind of standard under
which these claims were to be examined was left unresolved—St.
Claire v. Cuyler allowed greater autonomy for prison officials who
wished to enhance prison security, while Barnett suggested that a prisoner’s free exercise of religion should be ensured unless it came into
54
conflict with the compelling interests of the State.
C. The ‘80s: Big Hair, Big Shoulders, Big Circuit Split
The 1980s brought further differences in the handling of prisoners’ free exercise claims. In 1980, the Third Circuit in St. Claire v.
Cuyler applied only reasonable basis review to a Muslim prisoner’s
free exercise claim, upholding a prohibition of traditional Muslim
head-covering at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford,
Pennsylvania on the grounds that it inhibited prison safety disrupting
55
prison order.
The Seventh Circuit took a more evenhanded approach in Ma56
dyun v. Franzen in 1983. Madyun, an Illinois inmate, argued that his
Islamic faith prevented him from being searched by female prison
57
guards. The court applied a balancing test that weighed Madyun’s
right to free exercise against the State’s interest in uniformly applying
prison regulations, giving deference to rules that could be “reasona58
bly adapted” to protecting significant state interests. The court held
the State’s ability to frisk Madyun, no matter the sex of the guard performing the search, was more important than Madyun’s free exercise
59
rights on grounds of safety and equal employment.

52
53

54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 1000, 1003 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963)).
405 U.S. 319 (1972) (recognizing cause of action filed by Buddhist prisoner alleging denial of access to prison chapel, prohibition of contact with religious advisor, and solitary
confinement on account of his sharing religious material with other prisoners).
634 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1980); Barnett, 410 F.2d at 1000–01.
St. Claire, 634 F.2d at 113–14, 116.
704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 956.
Id. at 960.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit, in 1986, examined the issue in Shabazz v.
60
Barnauskas. Shabazz, a Muslim inmate of Florida State Prison, argued that the prison’s prohibition of his ability to grow a beard rep61
resented a violation of his free exercise rights. The court held that
such a claim should be analyzed under the least restrictive means test,
requiring that the government regulation be rationally related to a
substantial governmental interest, and that the restriction on the
right should be no greater than necessary to protect the governmen62
tal interest in question. Under this standard of review, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld Florida State Prison’s prohibition on beards because it
63
advanced the legitimate penological interest of prison security.
These rulings created a plethora of standards governing prisoners’ free exercise rights, with no definitive means of uniform enforcement. An individual incarcerated in one state could conceivably
have very different free exercise rights than a prisoner incarcerated
in another. This lack of legal symmetry did have grounding in penological security interests, but produced divergent results.
D. O’Lone/Turner: If It’s Reasonable, We Can Take Your Rights Away
In 1987, the divergence of standards in free exercise claims was
64
resolved. The Supreme Court’s ruling in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
standardized a test for prisoners’ free exercise claims, and reduced
the level of scrutiny for incursions upon prisoners’ rights to that of
65
“reasonableness.” In O’Lone, Muslim inmates of a New Jersey prison
alleged that prison officials had refused to allow them to attend
Jummah prayers, the traditional noontime Friday service of the Mus66
lim religion. New Jersey prison officials argued that regulations stipulated that inmates be working outside prison buildings during the
67
times at which the Muslim inmates wished to congregate for prayer.
The Supreme Court held that the prison officials had a legitimate security interest in preventing the association of Muslim prisoners at
certain times, especially since allowing such Friday congregations

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

790 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1537.
Id. at 1539.
Id. at 1540.
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 344–47.
Id. at 345–46.
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would place strain on prison resources during prisoner work hours.
In forming its opinion, the Court utilized a balancing test that it had
69
set out in Turner v. Safly. The Turner test mandated that a court assess a number of factors in order to determine whether a prisoner’s
70
free exercise rights had been unduly infringed. These factors included: (a) whether there is a valid government interest behind the
prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this regulation, the
incarcerated person has other means of exercising his or her rights;
(c) how the assertion of this right will impact prison costs and resources; and (d) whether there are alternative means that can be
71
used to satisfy the governmental interest.
In Turner, Missouri prison inmates challenged restrictions on their
72
right to written correspondence and on their right to marry. Missouri prisons had restricted prisoner correspondence to include only
a prisoner’s family, and had only allowed inmates to marry for “compelling” reasons, arguing that such restrictions were necessary to
73
maintain prison security. The Supreme Court upheld the restriction on correspondence, applying the above test and ruling that it did
not infringe on First Amendment rights, but struck down the restriction on marriage as a violation of the prisoners’ Fourteenth Amend74
ment rights.
The standards set forth in Turner and applied in O’Lone proved to
be somewhat problematic. The Turner test had been conceived in
order to deal with freedom of speech issues, which sometimes made it
75
a difficult fit for free exercise issues. The key difficulty hinges on
the availability of alternative means of practice stated in the Turner
76
test. There are fundamental differences in the actual practice of the
rights of free speech and free exercise, despite the fact that both fall
under the First Amendment of the Constitution. Analogizing to the
facts of Turner and O’Lone helps to illuminate these differences. The
prisoners in Turner were deprived of their right to certain kinds of
communication, but the deprivation was acceptable because they

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 351–53.
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 88–91.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 91, 96–97.
See Frankel, supra note 47, at 1637–41 (exploring this discordance).
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 88–91.
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77

were allowed to utilize others. Similarly, the prisoners in O’Lone
were deprived of one kind of religious congregation, but the depriva78
tion was acceptable because they could congregate at other times.
However, the two rights are not exactly analogous—eliminating one
avenue of communication when others are present is not the same as
prohibiting the Jummah prayer—which is roughly the same as eliminating the Sabbath for Jewish or Christian prisoners—while allowing
prayer at other times. The point is not that one of these rights
should trump the other in terms of exchange analysis; the point is instead that the two rights are fundamentally different, and very different results flow from analyzing them under a clumsy universal standard.
E. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Free Exercise Is Back in Business
The difficulties created by the application of the O’Lone/Turner
standard, along with public worries that free exercise claims by prisoners were too narrowly examined by courts, were assuaged in 1993
when Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
79
(“RFRA”). The Act mandated that all free exercise claims be examined under the compelling interest test that had been set forth in two
80
81
82
early cases, Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder. Since the Act’s
passage, the will of Congress has been added to the prisoners’ struggle to gain free exercise rights.
Sherbert and Yoder, set almost a decade apart, deal with free exercise claims outside of the prison context. Their sentiment, however,
is in line with the D.C. Circuit ruling in Barnett, holding the govern83
ment to a stricter standard when free exercise claims are on the line.
In Sherbert, the Supreme Court considered a claim brought by a
84
Seventh Day Adventist in South Carolina. The plaintiff argued that
her faith prevented her from working on Saturday, the day that Ad85
ventists regard to be the Sabbath. This belief had led her to be fired

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 96.
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351–53 (1987).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). These sentiments are echoed in Gaubatz, supra note 24, at
509.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–400.
Id.
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from multiple places of employ, resulting in her need to apply for
unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
86
Compensation Act. The State of South Carolina refused to grant
her the unemployment compensation, arguing that she refused to
87
accept work when it was offered to her. The Supreme Court took a
protective stance towards the Free Exercise Clause, and ruled that
South Carolina, if it wished to uphold a curtailment of the Free Exercise Clause, had the burden of showing that such curtailment repre88
sented a compelling state interest. The Court further stated that
“no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give oc89
casion for permissible limitation.’” Ultimately, the Court held that
90
South Carolina had failed to meet such a burden.
The Court in Yoder applied the same standard that had been set
91
out in Sherbert. The plaintiffs in Yoder were members of the Old Or92
der Amish religion residing in the state of Wisconsin. Under their
religious traditions, children would attend public or private school
until the eighth grade, after which time they would withdraw from
93
school. The plaintiffs believed that high school attendance went
94
against their religious tenets. The State of Wisconsin had in place a
law that compelled compulsory attendance of school for all children,
95
no matter their religious beliefs, until the age of sixteen. Wisconsin
prosecuted the plaintiffs for removing their children from the education system before the appointed time, and the plaintiffs claimed that
96
the state violated their free exercise rights. The Court held that the
State of Wisconsin had the burden of proving that forcing the Amish
children to attend school represented a “state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
Id. at 407.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208–09.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208–09.
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97

Free Exercise Clause.” Ultimately, the Court found the State of Wis98
consin to be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
The effect of RFRA on the free exercise claims by prisoners, in
light of the standards set out in Sherbert and Yoder, was to tip the scales
99
in favor of prisoners’ rights. Additionally, both of the rulings in
Sherbert and Yoder prevailed against arguments made by the States in
support of economic efficiency, suggesting that favoritism for such
arguments in earlier cases involving prisoners’ free exercise claims
100
would no longer prove superior.
F. The Boerne Ultimatum
Whether or not the RFRA would lead to such results remained
unproven, as the Supreme Court struck it down just four years after it
101
came into effect. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court considered a case in which the Archbishop of San Antonio asserted a
102
A Catholic church in the city of Boerne,
claim under the RFRA.
Texas wanted to expand its building in order to accommodate grow103
ing church attendance.
The City of Boerne denied the church’s
application for expansion, arguing that the church had been zoned
within a protected historic district, which subjected any proposed
construction to approval by the city’s Historic Landmark Commis104
sion.
The Archbishop asserted a claim under RFRA, arguing that
the City of Boerne was unlawfully constraining the Church’s religious
freedom rights; the City of Boerne responded by challenging the
105
constitutionality of RFRA.
The Court struck down the law on the
grounds that RFRA was failing to achieve its stated purpose, namely
that it was too great in scope to combat state laws that promoted reli106
gious bigotry and that it was a breach of the separation of powers.
97
98
99
100

101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 214.
Id. at 234.
See e.g., Sasnett v. Dep’t of Corr., 891 F. Supp 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that prison
officials could not prevent prisoners from owning religious books and symbols).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224 (describing the State’s argument that Amish students who did
not complete high school and later chose to leave Amish life would be unprepared for
life outside of the Amish community); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (describing the State’s argument that allowances for compensation for those who could not
work on Saturdays would damage the unemployment compensation fund).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 511–12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 535–36.
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The ruling in Boerne signaled that both the legislature and the judiciary believed that there was a need to protect First Amendment religious rights, but RFRA was not focused enough to achieve this end
effectively. The gap left by the annihilation of RFRA was filled by
Congress three years later.
G. RLUIPA: Restoring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Partly in response to the Supreme Court’s actions in Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
107
(“RLUIPA”) in late 2000, in order to enhance religious freedom
claims made by both prisoners and those struggling against land use
108
regulations. The Act mandates that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov109
ernmental interest.

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the regulation in question “substantially burdens” his or her religious freedom rights, and
the government bears the burden on all other elements of the
110
claim.
The jurisdiction extends to all programs and activities that
111
receive financing from the federal government. RLUIPA effectively
upholds the same standards found in RFRA but narrows the scope,
applying the legislation only to claims involving either land use or in112
carcerated persons. Additionally, the compelling interest standard
is tempered by the least restrictive means test that was used by the
113
Eleventh Circuit in Shabazz v. Barnauskas. Early on, RLUIPA caused
114
115
a split amongst the circuit courts, but was ultimately upheld.

107
108

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
Id. § 2000cc–1; see also John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc et seq.), 181
A.L.R. FED. 247 (2002) (collecting cases).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
Id. § 2000cc–2(b).
Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 2000cc–1.
790 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986).
See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing circuit split).
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
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Three cases, Madison v. Riter, Cutter v. Wilkinson, and Lovelace v.
118
Lee shed particular light on the courts’ implementation of RLUIPA
and are discussed below.
The Fourth Circuit considered Madison v. Riter in 2003, during a
119
period where circuit courts had split in their treatment of RLUIPA.
Madison was an inmate in a Virginia Department of Corrections prison who adhered to a Christian denomination that obeyed dietary laws
detailed in the Hebrew Scriptures, requiring him to keep a kosher
120
diet. While local corrections officials were happy to comply with his
needs, their overseers in Richmond believed that adequate alternative diets were already provided in the facility in which Madison was
121
incarcerated. Madison sued the Department of Corrections, asserting a religious freedom claim under RLUIPA, and the Department of
Corrections responded by challenging RLUIPA on constitutional
122
grounds.
The Fourth Circuit looked to the Congressional intent
behind RLUIPA, reasoning that the statute was crafted to comply
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Boerne, while still protecting the
123
religious freedom rights of incarcerated persons. The court further
clarified the problem with free exercise claims that had manifested
itself during the O’Lone/Turner era, in which free exercise rights and
other First Amendment rights were adjudicated along the same broad
standard. The court gave the example that, under O’Lone/Turner, a
prisoner’s right to possess pornography would be judged along the
124
same standard as his or her right to possess religious materials. The
court held that RLUIPA was the appropriate remedy to this quandary, providing heightened protection to religious freedom rights in
125
the penological context.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that
116
117
118
119

120
121
122
123
124
125

Madison, 355 F.3d at 316.
Cutter, 544 U.S. 709.
No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007) (mem.).
355 F.3d at 316 (citing Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
RLUIPA); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Cutter v. Wilkinson 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (invalidating RLUIPA)).
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 315; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997).
Madison, 355 F.3d at 319.
Id.; see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342, 351–53 (1987) (ruling that prison
restrictions on the prayer times of Muslim inmates were based on valid government interests, efficient, and afforded prisoners other means of exercising their First Amendment
rights); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (ruling that prison restrictions on written
correspondence were efficient, valid government interests that still allowed prisoners
other means to exercise their First Amendment rights).
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RLUIPA’s application in prisoners’ religious freedom cases was con126
stitutional, and remanded Madison’s case for further consideration.
In 2005, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
RLUIPA in the penological context in Cutter, putting an end to the
circuit split. The inmates in Cutter were all incarcerated within the
Ohio penal system, and belonged to the respective religious traditions of Satanist, Wicca, and Asatu religions, and the Church of Jesus
127
Christ Christian. All had raised claims under RLUIPA alleging that
the Ohio penal system had failed to allow exercise of their religious
128
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections
beliefs.
129
had countered by challenging the constitutionality of RLUIPA.
The Sixth Circuit held below that RLUIPA was unconstitutional, on
the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause by treating relig130
iously-based claims within prison differently from those without.
131
The Supreme Court reversed, holding RLUIPA to be constitutional.
The Court clarified that while RLUIPA applied a compelling interest
standard to prisoners’ religious freedom claims, it did not trump an
132
“institution’s need to maintain order and safety.” Additionally, the
Court held that RLUIPA mandated “due deference” to the superior
penological knowledge of prison administrators when weighing considerations of safety, efficiency, and cost, and that courts should attempt to interpret compelling governmental interests in terms of the
133
full context of the claim.
The treatment of prisoners’ religious freedom was further refined
134
in 2007 by the Western District of Virginia in Lovelace v. Lee. Lovelace was a member of the Nation of Islam and an inmate at the Keen
135
Mountain Correctional Center in Virginia.
During the month of
Ramadan, inmates at the correctional center were allowed to alter
their meal times and attend group prayers in order to comport with
136
the religious requirements of Ramadan.
Once inmates opted to
adhere to the special schedule during Ramadan, they were not al-

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Madison, 355 F.3d at 322.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 713–14.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750, at *1–*3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007) (mem.).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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lowed to eat regular meals during the day in the prison cafeteria.
Violation of this prohibition would cause the inmate to be removed
from the altered Ramadan scheduling, forcing them to rejoin regular
138
prison meal times.
Lovelace was accused by prison officials of entering the cafeteria during regular meal times, and was then removed
139
Lovelace contended that he
from the altered Ramadan schedule.
had not entered the dining hall during regular meal times, and that
his deprivation of the Ramadan schedule was instead a retributive
move against him by the prison’s cafeteria staff, with whom he had
140
argued earlier in the day.
Lovelace initially sought administrative
141
Prison offirelief, and eventually asserted a claim under RLUIPA.
cials later admitted that Lovelace had been falsely accused of break142
ing the prison’s Ramadan rules. The religious freedom claim, after
being reviewed and remanded by the Court of Appeals, was treated to
both a deferential review under RLUIPA standards and a review un143
der the test set forth in O’Lone/Turner. Prison officials argued that
it was necessary to regulate the prisoners’ observance of Ramadan
under strict standards, as the allowance called for the use of additional prison staff to supervise the movement of prisoners during the
144
nighttime hours.
Prison officials argued that these concerns, coupled with the costs of maintaining a special diet and meal times during Ramadan, constituted a compelling state interest in dealing
145
harshly with inmates who violated the prison’s Ramadan policies.
They further argued that there were no less restrictive means of balancing the prisoners’ right to observe Ramadan against the needs of
146
prison safety. The court recognized the prison officials’ concern as
a sufficiently compelling interest under RLUIPA standards; however,
it also held that the means by which the Ramadan rules were implemented—that violation of the fast precluded a prisoner from taking
part in any Ramadan observances—were not the least restrictive
147
means possible.
It is interesting, in light of the judicial history of

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id. at *1–*3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–*5.
Id. at *8–*9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *12–*17.
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prisoners’ freedom of religion claims, that the court considered the
least restrictive means issue outside of the context of prison costs or
148
efficiency. The court’s O’Lone/Turner analysis was similarly satisfied
149
by the compelling interest arguments of prison officials.
The current state of the law provides relief for religious freedom
cases by prisoners under the standards of RLUIPA. Courts applying
RLUIPA will most likely apply a standard that is in line with Loveless
and Cutter, taking a deferential stance towards a prison administrator’s definition of a compelling interest, while analyzing the least restrictive means of the prison regulations as a separate analytical
150
prong. As a final note, it is important to remember that the more
lax O’Lone/Turner standards are also still applicable to free exercise
claims made by prisoners, as RLUIPA exists as a statutory cause of ac151
tion on its own.
III. ANALYSIS
Under current doctrine, the Standardized Chapel Library Project
not only constitutes a violation of prisoners’ religious freedom rights
under RLUIPA and their free exercise rights under the standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in Turner and O’Lone, but is also against
public policy. Even when viewed in a light that is deferential to the
expertise of prison administrators, the Standardized Chapel Library
Project, as executed, does not embody a compelling governmental
interest; it places a substantial burden on the free exercise rights of
prisoners, and it is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing its
purported objectives. Further, the rational connection between the
actions mandated by the Standardized Chapel Library Project and
the professed purpose of the Project is tenuous at best. Alternative
means are available for accomplishing the goals recommended by the
federal government for the Project, means that would necessitate less
of an infringement on prisoners’ free exercise rights. The simple cataloging of books present in prison chapel libraries—just as public libraries across the United States already do—and making these records available to federal authorities, could easily solve the problem.
These alternative means may place a mild strain on prison resources,
but such efforts greatly outweigh the risks run by depriving prisoners

148
149
150
151

Id.
Id. at *18–*19.
See id.; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005).
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–91 (1987).
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of access to religious texts. Finally, the Standardized Chapel Library
Project clearly represents an extreme response to concerns voiced by
federal authorities. Before beginning a more detailed legal analysis
of the Project, it is necessary to clarify its origins and execution.
A. Background of the Standardized Chapel Library Project
The Federal Bureau of Prisons began implementing the Standardized Chapel Library Project early in 2007, but the Project’s roots extend to a report that was released by the Inspector General of the
152
Department of Justice in 2004. The Department of Justice’s report
was prompted by congressional concerns that the Muslim service providers selected by the Bureau of Prisons might come from groups
153
with ties to “exclusionary” and “extreme” forms of Islam.
The report analyzed the methods used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in
its selection of Muslim chaplains, and then offered recommendations
on monitoring the actions of religious service providers once they
were allowed access to correctional facilities run by the Federal Bu154
reau of Prisons. The Department of Justice Report offered sixteen
suggestions to the Bureau of Prisons regarding Muslim service pro155
viders. The bulk of these suggestions focused on reforming the Bureau of Prisons’ interview process for Muslim service providers, increasing the education of prison staffers with regard to Islam,
increasing information flow between the Bureau of Prisons and offices of federal law enforcement, improving monitoring for all prison
religious services, and working closely with existing Muslim chaplains

152

153
154
155

Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13 (providing the basic facts of the implementation of the
Standardized Chapel Library Project); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS
SERVICES PROVIDERS 3–4 (2004) [hereinafter MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS]
(analyzing the criteria used by the Bureau of Prisons in selecting Muslim religious representatives for inmates, and recommending heightened supervision for such service providers and the inmates to whom they minister). For a more developed discussion of the
aftermath of the Project’s implementation, see Neela Banerjee, Prisons to Return Purged
Items to Chapels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at A29. For a more thorough report of the
motivations behind the Project, the works seized, and the litigation that followed, see Gerard V. Bradley, Unholy Prison Break, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2007, available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZmY4ODIwYjE1MjYwNDU3ZjBlZGQ5YzI4NGU0O
TZmZDg= (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 50–55.
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to better the Muslim service provider selection process. The penultimate suggestion made in the report dealt with prison libraries:
The [Bureau of Prisons] should conduct an inventory of chapel books
and videos and re-screen them to confirm that they are permissible under [Bureau of Prisons] security policies. The [Bureau of Prisons]
should consider maintaining a central registry of acceptable material to
157
prevent duplication of effort when reviewing these materials.

This single suggestion would prove to be the primary motivating fac158
tor for the Standardized Chapel Library Project.
Administrators from the Bureau of Prisons found the Department
of Justice’s recommendations for prison chapel libraries to be too ar159
The Bureau began implementing the recommendation by
duous.
attempting to take inventory of all items present in federal prison li160
braries, but soon changed their tactics. Rather than finding other
means to honor the Department of Justice’s recommendation, the
Bureau of Prisons sought to simplify the matter—they decided to create lists of acceptable materials for each of twenty religious categories,
and remove all materials that did not comport with the standardized
161
162
list. This effort was the Standardized Chapel Library Project. All
163
If a religious
removed materials were stored for further vetting.
service provider at the prison wanted to restore access to a specific
text or object, he or she would be required to examine the entirety of
the work, fill out a certification form, and then send the form on to
the central offices of the Bureau in Washington, D.C., where administrators would decide whether or not to add the text to the Standard164
ized Chapel Library Project.
The effects of the Project were widespread and absurd. Instead of storing confiscated materials, some
165
books were destroyed. The removed texts included works across religions that had no prior history of inciting radicalism. The Project
excluded Jewish texts such as Maimonide’s Code of Jewish Law, Zo-

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

165

Id.
Id. at 55.
Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The religious categories recognized by the Bureau of Prisons were: Bahai, Buddhist,
Catholic, General Spirituality, Hindu, Islam, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaism, Messianic,
Mormon, Nation of Islam, Native American, Orthodox, Other Religions, Pagan, Protestant, Rastafarian, Sikh, and Yoruba. Id.
Complaint at 2, Milstein v. Lappin, No. 07–CV–07434 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007).
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har, and When Bad Things Happen to Good People by Rabbi Harold S.
166
Christian hymnals and guides, as well as religious comKushner.
mentary such as The Purpose Driven Life by Reverend Rick Warren were
167
confiscated. Muslim prayer books, prayer guides, and copies of the
Hadith (the second most important Muslim religious source after the
168
The regulations and methodologies beQur’an) were removed.
hind the selection of titles for the Standardized Chapel Library Project were never codified or publicized; instead they were imple169
mented through internal memos at the Bureau of Prisons.
These
memos initially called for the destruction of materials removed from
chapel libraries; later, prison facilities were allowed to store the
170
books.
Widespread protests of the Project led the Bureau of Prisons to halt its implementation late in 2007, but the Bureau has re171
fused to reverse its policy.
B. RLUIPA
The Standardized Chapel Library Project places a substantial burden on prisoners’ religious freedom. Even when deference is given
to the experience of prison administrators and special consideration
is given to the environment of prison chapel libraries, the purposes
behind the Project do not rise to the level of a compelling governmental interest. The Project is also not the least restrictive means of
accomplishing what the Bureau of Prisons professes is its underlying
rationale.
In order to trigger RLUIPA, the prisoner’s religious exercise right
must be substantially burdened by the actions or regulations of prison
172
administrators. A burden on religious freedom becomes substantial
when it places a “significantly great restriction or onus upon such ex173
174
ercise.” In Sanders v. Ryan, the District of Arizona held that prison
administrators did not substantially burden a prisoner’s religious
freedom when they required him to discard some religious materials

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10–12.
Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2000).
Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2007).
Id.
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175

in order to exchange them with an equal number of new ones.
176
Similarly, in Adkins v. Kaspar, the Fifth Circuit held that preventing
a prisoner from observing the Sabbath on a certain day was permissi177
ble if he was allowed to observe the Sabbath on an alternate day.
178
Additionally, in Lovelace v. Lee, the Fourth Circuit held that preventing an inmate from observing the religious practices associated with
Ramadan did constitute a substantial burden on the inmate’s reli179
gious freedom. The onus on religious freedom that leads to a substantial burden seems to occur when religious activities are limited
without any kind of reciprocity. Religious materials can be confiscated, but they must be replaced by an equal number of new materials. Organized worship can be prevented on a certain day, as long as
it is allowed on another. The entirety of one kind of religious practice cannot be taken away. Likewise, the unilateral removal of nonapproved texts from prison chapel libraries through the Standardized
Chapel Library Project, an action that greatly depleted the reserves of
the chapel libraries affected, placed a substantial burden on prison180
ers’ religious freedom.
When gauging whether acts or regulations of prison administrators constitute a compelling state interest, deference is given to the
superior experience of prison authorities, and the alleged compelling
state interest should be examined in the full context of the regula181
tion. Concerns of order and safety within prisons have been widely
182
recognized as compelling state interests. Concerns that radical religious groups could negatively impact prison safety, as voiced in the
Justice Department’s report, comport with the government’s compelling interest in maintaining prison safety. The Standardized Chapel
Library Project is out of step with the goals expressed in the Justice
Department’s review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ selection
183
process for Muslim service providers.
It is clear when examining
the totality of the Justice Department’s review, that the intention of
its recommendations was to ensure that the causes of incitement of
radical Islam would be removed from the federal penal system, and
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 1035.
393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 571.
472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 187.
Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005).
See, e.g., id. at 722.
MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1.
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that measures would be taken to monitor and harmonize religious
184
practices within federal prisons. The Standardized Chapel Library
Project, as executed, departs from this purpose by widely removing
primarily non-offensive religious materials, and therefore should not
be viewed as having a rational relation to the compelling governmental interest of preventing religious extremism in federal prisons. In
fact, the widespread outcry from prisoners that accompanied the car185
rying out of the Project could be seen as directly going against the
compelling governmental interest of preserving prison safety. When
courts have sanctioned the limiting and removal of religious materials
as part of a compelling governmental interest in preserving prison
safety, it has been in the context of removing certain materials that by
their very nature are clearly capable of inciting religiously motivated
186
violence in prisons. In Marria v. Broaddus, the Southern District of
New York determined that prison officials' absolute ban on Five Percenter literature constituted a compelling state interest in preserving
prison safety and precluded summary judgment, as such literature
could possibly lead to racial and political unrest within the prison sys187
tem. In comparison, the Western District of Wisconsin, in Lindell v.
188
Casperson, held that prison administrators had a compelling governmental interest in preventing Wotanists from possessing materials
189
relating to Nazism as required by the religion.
The Standardized
Chapel Library Project fails to work with such precision, as it does not
selectively remove materials that could potentially incite violence.
Such slipshod enforcement should not be seen as an effective means
of advancing something as important as a compelling governmental
interest in prison safety.
The least restrictive means prong of RLUIPA stands alone as a
separate disqualifying factor for acts or restrictions made by prison
administrators, and it is not viewed with deference towards the eco190
nomic efficiency of prison operations.
The simple fact is that the
Standardized Chapel Library Project is not the least restrictive means
for furthering the compelling governmental interest in keeping materials that may incite religious extremism out of prison chapel librar184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 50–55.
Goodstein, supra note 1; see also Complaint, supra note 165, at 2–3.
200 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 298.
360 F. Supp. 2d 932 (W.D. Wis. 2005).
Id. at 954–55.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(2); Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750, at
*16–*17 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007).
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ies. The Project would be far less restrictive if it was carried out as the
Department of Justice intended. If the Federal Bureau of Prisons
cataloged the books in prison chapel libraries, and, if necessary, developed a system of tracking them, then the few books that could incite religious extremism could be removed and prisoners’ freedom of
191
religion would remain unmolested. If this project proved to be too
taxing for prison resources, then the Federal Bureau of Prisons could
compile an easily updateable list of texts that were known to incite religious violence and ensure that these were removed from prison
chapel libraries.
C. O’Lone/Turner
Even under the more permissive O’Lone/Turner standard, the
Standardized Chapel Library Project is still an unreasonable incursion on prisoners’ free exercise rights. The test of review of First
Amendment claims by prisoners established by the Supreme Court in
Turner and then applied to free exercise claims in O’Lone examines
acts or restrictions by prison administrators that affect prisoners’ First
Amendment rights under a four-point standard. In assessing whether
or not a prison regulation infringes upon an incarcerated person’s
constitutional rights, the Court looks to the following balancing test:
(a) if there is a valid governmental interest that reasonably relates to
the prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this regulation
the incarcerated person has other means of exercising his rights;
(c) how the assertion of this right will impact prison costs and resources; and (d) whether there are alternative means which can be
192
used to satisfy the governmental interest.
Under standards of reasonableness, the Standardized Chapel Library Project, viewed very
permissibly, does seem to satisfy the legitimate governmental interest
in protecting the order and safety of prisons by curtailing inmate access to materials that might incite religious extremism. If the Bureau
of Prisons removes most literature from prison chapel libraries and
leaves only a few books it knows to be benign, then it is almost assured of preventing inmate access to religious literature that may incite violence. However, given the actual effect of the Project—

191

See MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 55.

192

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–
91 (1987).
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inciting outcry amongst prisoners—the likelihood of it actually quiet193
ing religious complaints of prisoners is doubtful.
The question of whether the prisoners have other means of exercising their rights is debatable. Since the majority of books in chapel
libraries tend not to be on the list of acceptable texts maintained by
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the effect of the Standardized Chapel
Library Project has been to remove the majority of titles from prison
chapel library shelves. This presents an unacceptable effect of removing all titles from religions that may be underrepresented in prison
chapel libraries. While prisoners who practice religions that have a
significant presence in a given chapel library may be able to find alternative reading materials, others may not be so lucky. Since the
books are not replaced as they are removed, and the process for getting a book replaced on the shelf is arduous, there is a chance that
prisoners following certain religions may be seriously deprived of ne194
cessary religious texts for long periods of time.
Additionally, the
sensitive nature of religious belief makes it difficult to categorize
some texts of a given religion as “important” and others as “unnecessary,” making the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ list of acceptable titles
195
seem dangerously provocative.
The costs of the Standardized Chapel Library Project, taken alone,
are highly economical, as the Project simply involves removing books
from prison chapel library shelves. The long-term costs of the Project
may be higher, depending on the rate at which prisoners request new
titles, or attempt to have books certified through the time-consuming
196
restatement process.
Lastly, more effective alternatives, discussed
above, exist for the Project.
D. Policy Argument
The Standardized Chapel Library Project should not be pursued
as enacted on grounds of public policy, as the execution of the Project departs from the original plan recommended by the Department
of Justice and because the Project has engendered widespread criti-

193
194
195

196

See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
See id.
See Complaint, supra note 165, at 2–3. For example, a Jewish prisoner may desire access
to a copy of the Torah, but it should not be the place of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to
say that this same prisoner cannot have access to the Zohar, or the works of Maimonides,
or the Talmud.
See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.
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197

cism from public interest groups and legislators. While taking steps
to prevent domestic religious extremism is a legitimate and compelling governmental interest, it remains to be proven whether the
Standardized Chapel Library Project actually implements the suggestions put forth by the Department of Justice in a matter that accomplishes these ends. Widespread deprivation of religious texts might
do more to incense religious extremism within the federal prison system than the provision of unchecked religious materials would.
More importantly, the Standardized Chapel Library Project fails to
honor the Department of Justice’s recommendations to both catalog
and track the use of materials in prison chapel libraries; while the
Project ensures that materials in prison chapel libraries will not deviate from a set list, the Bureau of Prisons still has no means of tracking
198
the materials, nor does it know which prisons have which materials.
Further, support of only twenty broad religious categories raises the
possibility that the Standardized Chapel Library Project will not
199
honor some prisoners’ religious beliefs.
Lastly, the criticism that
the Project has drawn from myriad religions and both major political
parties makes it unlikely that the Department of Justice’s goals for
tracking religious materials in prison chapel libraries can be successfully enacted through the Standardized Chapel Library Project.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Standardized Chapel Library Project is a clear violation of
prisoners’ religious freedom under RLUIPA and their free exercise
rights under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner
and O’Lone, and is against public policy. Even when viewed in a light
that is deferential to the expertise of prison administrators, the Standardized Chapel Library Project, as executed, places a substantial
burden on the free exercise rights of prisoners, fails to comport with
the compelling state interest of preserving prison safety, and is not
the least restrictive means of accomplishing its purported objectives.
Further, the rational connection between the actions mandated by
the Standardized Chapel Library Project and the professed purpose
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See MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1; Goodstein, supra note 1,
at A13.

198

MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 55; Goodstein, supra note 1, at
A13.

199

See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. For a full list of religious categories considered by the
Standardized Chapel Library Project, see supra note 164.

1162

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

of the Project, as per the Department of Justice’s recommendations,
is tenuous at best. Alternative means are available for accomplishing
the goals recommended by the federal government for the Project,
means that would necessitate less of an infringement on prisoners’
free exercise rights. The Federal Bureau of Prisons could simply implement the exact recommendations of the Department of Justice, or
they could compile an updatable list of unacceptable materials that
could easily be removed from chapel library shelves. These alternative means may place mild strain on prison resources, but such efforts
greatly outweigh the risks run by depriving prisoners of access to religious texts, which could possibly incite violence and unrest within
prison populations. Finally, the Standardized Chapel Library Project
clearly represents an extreme response to concerns voiced by federal
authorities, and it has encountered wide condemnation from both
public interest groups and legislators.

